Rowe's Evidential Argument From Evil
William Rowe (b. 1931) has advanced one of the most compelling arguments against the existence of an omni-God on the basis of suffering in the world. For the argument that follows, Rowe has in mind "intense" suffering that is experienced by human's and animals.
THE ARGUMENT
1. There exist instances of intense suffering which an omnipotent, omniscient being could have prevented without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse.
2. An omniscient, wholly good being would prevent the occurrence of any intense suffering it could, unless it could not do so without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse.
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3. Therefore, there does not exist an omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good being [1].
PREMISE 2
In justifying premise 2, consider an instance of intense human or animal suffering, S. Rowe concedes that if God were to exist, He might be justified in allowing S to occur under the following conditions:
- S contributes to some greater good, G, which can only be obtained through S.
- Some greater good, G, can only be obtained with some other, equally intense instance of suffering.
- The prevention of S results in the occurrence of some equally bad or worse instance of suffering.
PREMISE 1
Rowe takes there to be instances of suffering that are, probably speaking, not able to be justified viz-a-viz (1)-(3). In other words, there are instances of gratuitous suffering. As an example, he invites the reader to imagine a fawn that is trapped in a forest fire, severely burned, and left to suffer for days before finally dying. It appears to Rowe that such instances of suffering could have been prevented by an omni-God without losing some greater good. Rowe grants that soul-development, freewill, and other such goods may be grounds for allowing some kinds of suffering to occur, but that "it's reasonably clear that suffering often occurs in a degree far beyond what is required for character development...[and] it's clear that much intense suffering occurs not as a result of human free choices" (Rowe: 359). It appears that the fawns suffering served none of these goods and could have been prevented without losing some greater good. If we believe that such instances of suffering occur in the world (and Rowe thinks there are many such instances), then an omni-God cannot exist. In a nutshell:
1. There is gratuitous suffering in the world.
2. If an omni-God existed, there would be no gratuitous suffering in the world.
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3. Therefore, an omni-God does not exist.
To be clear, Rowe is not arguing that one can know for certain that no greater good is actualized in an instance of seemingly meaningless evil. Rather, he maintains that "We are often in the position where in the light of our experience and knowledge it is rational to believe that a certain statement is true, even though we are not in a position to prove or to know with certainty that the statement is true." His basic justification, then, for premise 2 is that "it seems quite unlikely that all the instances of intense suffering occurring daily in our world are intimately related to the occurrence of greater goods or the prevention of evils at least as bad" (Rowe: 358).
APPEARS-LOCUTIONS: WYKSTRA'S CLARIFICATION
In his response to Rowe's evidential POE, Steve Wykstra elucidates Rowe's justification for premise 1, claiming that it can be easy to misunderstand Rowe's position. As Wykstra sees it, Rowe justifies his belief in gratuitous evil by appealing to what appears to be the case (in an epistemic sense) [2]. Often, we are justified in affirming some belief X simply because "X appears to be the case." Wykstra writes, "And this move is, on the face of it anyway, licensed by what many philosophers regard as a proper, indeed primary and indispensable, principle of justification: what Richard Swinburne calls 'the Principle of Credulity', or what might more descriptively be called 'the "seems so, is so" presumption'" (Wykstra: 150).
In light of this, some might interpret Rowe to be saying the following: "S does not appear to have any purpose. Therefore, it does not have any purpose." They will then argue that this is merely an argument from ignorance -- just because "it does not appear to me that S has any purpose," or simply because "I cannot think of or see any purpose S might serve," does not mean that there is no such purpose. Wykstra does not think that this is the most generous interpretation of Rowe. Consider the following appears-locutions:
Q1: it does not appear that p.
Q2: it appears that not-p.
These, according to Wykstra, are very different assertions (at least to a philosopher. This may not always be obvious in common ways of speaking). To see why, consider the following assertions about Fred:
P1: it does not appear that Fred is intelligent.
P2: it appears that Fred is not intelligent.
At most, P1 is asserting that "Fred's intelligence is not discernible or obvious." In other words, Fred's intelligence, if he has any, is not epistemically detectable. To move from "it does not appear that Fred is intelligent" to, "therefore, Fred is not intelligent," would be an argument from ignorance. P2, on the other hand, is asserting that, given a cognitive assessment of the situation, Fred really appears non-intelligent, not merely that Fred's intelligence is not apparent. Thus, P2 justifies the conclusion that "Fred is not intelligent." This is like the difference between looking for a sofa in a large cluttered wear-house and saying, "there does not appear to be a sofa," on the one hand, and saying, "it appears that there simply is no sofa," on the other. The second claim is a prime candidate for justifying the conclusion that "there is no sofa in the wear-house.
In the same way, Wykstra submits that Rowe's justification for premise 1 is by means of Q2. He is moving from "It appears that S has no God-justifying reason," to, "therefore, S does not have a God-justifying reason." Hence, Rowe is not merely arguing from "S does not appear to have a God-justifying reason" (as in, "I can't discern what the reason might be") to "S does not have a God-justifying reason." If that were the case, Wykstra thinks, then "this would indeed be an argument from ignorance" (Wykstra: 149). But again, Wykstra takes Rowe to be arguing that, given the "cognitive-epistemic" appearance of the situation, there are no justifying reasons of the (1)-(3) sort for many instances of intense suffering. This is so in virtue of the fact that these instances simply appear to have no justifying reasons. Since we often take a premise of the sort "it appears that not-p" to justify the conclusion "not-p," Rowe, likewise, takes himself to be justified in claiming that there is pointless suffering on the basis that certain instances of intense evil appear to have no God-justifying reasons.
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Footnotes:
1. Rowe, William. "The Evidential Argument from Evil." Philosophy of Religion: Selected Readings. Ed. Michael Peterson, William Hasker, Bruce Reichenbach, and David Basinger. New York: Oxford University Press, 2007. Print.
2. Wykstra, Stephen J. "The Humean Obstacle to Evidential Arguments from Suffering: on Avoiding the Evils of 'Appearance.'."Calvin.edu. N.p., n.d. Web. 24 Jan. 2014.
1. There is gratuitous suffering in the world.
2. If an omni-God existed, there would be no gratuitous suffering in the world.
__________________
3. Therefore, an omni-God does not exist.
To be clear, Rowe is not arguing that one can know for certain that no greater good is actualized in an instance of seemingly meaningless evil. Rather, he maintains that "We are often in the position where in the light of our experience and knowledge it is rational to believe that a certain statement is true, even though we are not in a position to prove or to know with certainty that the statement is true." His basic justification, then, for premise 2 is that "it seems quite unlikely that all the instances of intense suffering occurring daily in our world are intimately related to the occurrence of greater goods or the prevention of evils at least as bad" (Rowe: 358).
APPEARS-LOCUTIONS: WYKSTRA'S CLARIFICATION
In his response to Rowe's evidential POE, Steve Wykstra elucidates Rowe's justification for premise 1, claiming that it can be easy to misunderstand Rowe's position. As Wykstra sees it, Rowe justifies his belief in gratuitous evil by appealing to what appears to be the case (in an epistemic sense) [2]. Often, we are justified in affirming some belief X simply because "X appears to be the case." Wykstra writes, "And this move is, on the face of it anyway, licensed by what many philosophers regard as a proper, indeed primary and indispensable, principle of justification: what Richard Swinburne calls 'the Principle of Credulity', or what might more descriptively be called 'the "seems so, is so" presumption'" (Wykstra: 150).
In light of this, some might interpret Rowe to be saying the following: "S does not appear to have any purpose. Therefore, it does not have any purpose." They will then argue that this is merely an argument from ignorance -- just because "it does not appear to me that S has any purpose," or simply because "I cannot think of or see any purpose S might serve," does not mean that there is no such purpose. Wykstra does not think that this is the most generous interpretation of Rowe. Consider the following appears-locutions:
Q1: it does not appear that p.
Q2: it appears that not-p.
These, according to Wykstra, are very different assertions (at least to a philosopher. This may not always be obvious in common ways of speaking). To see why, consider the following assertions about Fred:
P1: it does not appear that Fred is intelligent.
P2: it appears that Fred is not intelligent.
At most, P1 is asserting that "Fred's intelligence is not discernible or obvious." In other words, Fred's intelligence, if he has any, is not epistemically detectable. To move from "it does not appear that Fred is intelligent" to, "therefore, Fred is not intelligent," would be an argument from ignorance. P2, on the other hand, is asserting that, given a cognitive assessment of the situation, Fred really appears non-intelligent, not merely that Fred's intelligence is not apparent. Thus, P2 justifies the conclusion that "Fred is not intelligent." This is like the difference between looking for a sofa in a large cluttered wear-house and saying, "there does not appear to be a sofa," on the one hand, and saying, "it appears that there simply is no sofa," on the other. The second claim is a prime candidate for justifying the conclusion that "there is no sofa in the wear-house.
In the same way, Wykstra submits that Rowe's justification for premise 1 is by means of Q2. He is moving from "It appears that S has no God-justifying reason," to, "therefore, S does not have a God-justifying reason." Hence, Rowe is not merely arguing from "S does not appear to have a God-justifying reason" (as in, "I can't discern what the reason might be") to "S does not have a God-justifying reason." If that were the case, Wykstra thinks, then "this would indeed be an argument from ignorance" (Wykstra: 149). But again, Wykstra takes Rowe to be arguing that, given the "cognitive-epistemic" appearance of the situation, there are no justifying reasons of the (1)-(3) sort for many instances of intense suffering. This is so in virtue of the fact that these instances simply appear to have no justifying reasons. Since we often take a premise of the sort "it appears that not-p" to justify the conclusion "not-p," Rowe, likewise, takes himself to be justified in claiming that there is pointless suffering on the basis that certain instances of intense evil appear to have no God-justifying reasons.
Footnotes:
1. Rowe, William. "The Evidential Argument from Evil." Philosophy of Religion: Selected Readings. Ed. Michael Peterson, William Hasker, Bruce Reichenbach, and David Basinger. New York: Oxford University Press, 2007. Print.
2. Wykstra, Stephen J. "The Humean Obstacle to Evidential Arguments from Suffering: on Avoiding the Evils of 'Appearance.'."Calvin.edu. N.p., n.d. Web. 24 Jan. 2014.
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