Rowe's Defense of the Evidential POE (Response to Wykstra)
In response to Wykstra's critique of the evidential problem of evil [1], William Rowe accepts Wykstra's Condition of Reasonable Epistemic Access (CORNEA), but argues that it has not been successfully used against his original argument from evil.
"GOOD'S BEYOND OUR KEN"
Originally, Wykstra had argued that there may be goods "beyond our ken" that justify God in allowing some instance of seemingly gratuitous evil, E. If this is the case, then we cannot expect E to appear differently than it does if it is justified by some greater good. Presumably, if we knew what the greater good was that justified God in permitting E, then E would not appear gratuitous. Since we likely do not know the greater good by which E is permitted, E may very well appear the way it does whether it is justified or not. Thus, since CORNEA is not satisfied, we are not justified in saying that E is actually gratuitous (even if it appears gratuitous). Rowe takes Wykstra to start with the following assumption
1. God grasps goods beyond our ken.
and move to
2. It is likely that the goods in relation to which God permits suffering are beyond our ken.
Rowe accepts (1), but thinks that the move to (2) is not justified. He writes, "...the mere assumption that [God] exists gives us no reason whatever to suppose either that the greater goods in virtue of which he permits most sufferings are goods that come into existence far in the future of the sufferings we are aware of, or that once they do obtain we continue to be ignorant of them and their relation to the sufferings" [1]. If God has goods beyond our ken that could be obtained by permitting E, then, although these goods were initially beyond our ken, there is no reason to think that they will remain beyond our ken once God allows E.
RESTRICTED AND EXPANDED THEISM
Rowe's initial argument was directed at what he calls restricted theism -- a basic, traditional view of God, lacking doctrinally expanded notions of His nature. What Wykstra has done, Rowe maintains, is to smuggle in notions of God's nature from a form of expanded theism -- theism that is supplemented by additional postulates and beliefs about God which are not essential to restricted theism. Wykstra's form of expanded theism affirms that 1) even after E has occurred we are still not able to cognize the goods by which God justifies E, and 2) that the greater goods in relation to which God permits E will not be revealed until some future time. None of these beliefs are entailed by restricted theism, Rowe argues. Thus, by smuggling in postulates about God's nature from a form of expanded theism, "[Wykstra] has, unwittingly, changed the question" (Rowe: 100). The original question was whether seemingly gratuitous evil disconfirms restricted theism, not expanded theism. On restricted theism, we have "no reason to think that these goods, once they occur, remain beyond our ken. Nor does restricted standard theism give us reason to think that the occurrence of the goods in question lies in the distance future..." (Rowe: 99). As such, Rowe is unpersuaded by Wykstra's argument that if E had some God-justifying reason behind it, E would still strike us the same way as if it did not have a God-justifying reason, in virtue of the fact that the goods connected to it would remain completely beyond our knowledge. That line of thinking is not entailed by restricted theism -- or so Rowe maintains.
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Footnotes:
[1] Wykstra, Stephen J. "The Humean Obstacle to Evidential Arguments from Suffering: on Avoiding the Evils of 'Appearance.'."Calvin.edu. N.p., n.d. Web. 24 Jan. 2014.
[2] Rowe, William L. "Evil and the Theistic Hypothesis: A Response to Wykstra." International Journal for the Philosophy of Religion, Vol. 16, No. 2 (1984), pp. 95-100.
"GOOD'S BEYOND OUR KEN"
Originally, Wykstra had argued that there may be goods "beyond our ken" that justify God in allowing some instance of seemingly gratuitous evil, E. If this is the case, then we cannot expect E to appear differently than it does if it is justified by some greater good. Presumably, if we knew what the greater good was that justified God in permitting E, then E would not appear gratuitous. Since we likely do not know the greater good by which E is permitted, E may very well appear the way it does whether it is justified or not. Thus, since CORNEA is not satisfied, we are not justified in saying that E is actually gratuitous (even if it appears gratuitous). Rowe takes Wykstra to start with the following assumption
1. God grasps goods beyond our ken.
and move to
2. It is likely that the goods in relation to which God permits suffering are beyond our ken.
Rowe accepts (1), but thinks that the move to (2) is not justified. He writes, "...the mere assumption that [God] exists gives us no reason whatever to suppose either that the greater goods in virtue of which he permits most sufferings are goods that come into existence far in the future of the sufferings we are aware of, or that once they do obtain we continue to be ignorant of them and their relation to the sufferings" [1]. If God has goods beyond our ken that could be obtained by permitting E, then, although these goods were initially beyond our ken, there is no reason to think that they will remain beyond our ken once God allows E.
RESTRICTED AND EXPANDED THEISM
Rowe's initial argument was directed at what he calls restricted theism -- a basic, traditional view of God, lacking doctrinally expanded notions of His nature. What Wykstra has done, Rowe maintains, is to smuggle in notions of God's nature from a form of expanded theism -- theism that is supplemented by additional postulates and beliefs about God which are not essential to restricted theism. Wykstra's form of expanded theism affirms that 1) even after E has occurred we are still not able to cognize the goods by which God justifies E, and 2) that the greater goods in relation to which God permits E will not be revealed until some future time. None of these beliefs are entailed by restricted theism, Rowe argues. Thus, by smuggling in postulates about God's nature from a form of expanded theism, "[Wykstra] has, unwittingly, changed the question" (Rowe: 100). The original question was whether seemingly gratuitous evil disconfirms restricted theism, not expanded theism. On restricted theism, we have "no reason to think that these goods, once they occur, remain beyond our ken. Nor does restricted standard theism give us reason to think that the occurrence of the goods in question lies in the distance future..." (Rowe: 99). As such, Rowe is unpersuaded by Wykstra's argument that if E had some God-justifying reason behind it, E would still strike us the same way as if it did not have a God-justifying reason, in virtue of the fact that the goods connected to it would remain completely beyond our knowledge. That line of thinking is not entailed by restricted theism -- or so Rowe maintains.
_________________________________________________________________
Footnotes:
[1] Wykstra, Stephen J. "The Humean Obstacle to Evidential Arguments from Suffering: on Avoiding the Evils of 'Appearance.'."Calvin.edu. N.p., n.d. Web. 24 Jan. 2014.
[2] Rowe, William L. "Evil and the Theistic Hypothesis: A Response to Wykstra." International Journal for the Philosophy of Religion, Vol. 16, No. 2 (1984), pp. 95-100.
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