Positive Skeptical Theism

A traditional response to Rowe's evidential argument from evil is known as skeptical theism. Basically, skeptical theism, as proposed by Steve Wykstra and Michael Bergman (among others), argues that we are not in a good epistemic position to say that instances of seemingly pointless suffering are, in fact, pointless (or probably pointless). In his essay, "On the Epistemological Framework of Skeptical Theism," John DePoe argues that there are two kinds of skeptical theism: positive and negative.

NEGATIVE SKEPTICAL THEISM

Proponents of skeptical theism, argues DePoe, have typically endorsed what he calls negative skeptical theism, wherein no positive explanation is given for why God might allow instances of suffering to appear pointless. DePoe writes, "...negative skeptical theism casts doubt on our ability to understand any reasons God may have for permitting seemingly gratuitous evil, and it does not give any reasons that entail or probabilify the existence of seemingly gratuitous evil given theism" [1].

To further clarify, skeptical theists (and virtually everyone contributing to the discussion -- Rowe included) endorse the following proposition:

Q: God, if He exists, has knowledge of goods that humans are not in a position to know.

Skeptical theists maintain that Q is sufficient to show that proponents of the evidential POE are not justified in moving from (1) "it appears that E is pointless suffering" to (2) "E is pointless suffering," since there may be God-justifying goods beyond our grasp that are connected to E. Negative skeptical theists go no further than this. Why God would allow E to appear pointless is simply not addressed by these kinds of skeptical theists.

POSITIVE SKEPTICAL THEISM

Positive skeptical theism, on the other hand, endorses Q, but goes on to offer plausible "second order" reasons for why God would allow instances of suffering to appear pointless. DePoe writes the following:

"The key difference is that in the case of positive skeptical theism the motivation for the skeptical  component of skeptical theism is generated from one’s positive knowledge of God’s reasons for creating a world where there is seemingly gratuitous evil, whereas in the case of negative skeptical theism it is supported only by one’s inability to know God’s reasons for anything, including reasons He may or may not have for permitting seemingly gratuitous evil...Positive skeptical theism, by contrast, attempts to give reasons such that we would expect the appearance of gratuitous evils given theism" [2].

Although we may not be in a position to know the specific God-justifying reasons connected to seemingly pointless suffering ("first-order" justification), positive skeptical theists will offer second-order justification for why seemingly pointless suffering should be expected if Theism is true [3]. DePoe offers two such justifications:

1*. The reality of seemingly pointless suffering creates a degree of epistemic distance between humanity and God, making genuine faith possible, as well as making possible a unique kind of character transformation.

2*. The reality of seemingly pointless suffering creates the possibility for unique acts of compassion and love to obtain. 

Why think that seemingly pointless suffering is the best way to create the appropriate amount of epistemic distance described in (1*)? DePoe explains, "One reason is that the evidential problem of evil is particularly well-suited to bring about the appropriate kind of epistemic distance for virtually all persons irrespective of their upbringing, geographical location, level of education, or period of history in which they live. Seemingly gratuitous evil is a fairly universal and efficient way to create epistemic distance between God and created persons. Secondly, if all evil appeared to be meted out in morally justified ways—in other words, if there were no instances of seemingly gratuitous evil—it would make the epistemic distance between God and creature vanishingly small" [4].

Regarding (2*), DePoe states the following: "Seemingly pointless evil is, therefore, needed to bring some of the most extraordinary acts of compassion and sympathy freely. In a world where all disasters and diseases only harmed those who appeared to deserve them in proportions appropriate to their just deserts, humans would not have the opportunity to exhibit feats of exceptional love, sympathy, and compassion. In order for God to provoke extraordinary human responses of love and self-giving, it is necessary for some evil to appear as if it is gratuitous. So, if God intends to bring about these kinds of responses through the free actions of his creatures, then the existence of seemingly gratuitous evils is required to achieve that end" [5].

THE ADVANTAGES OF POSITIVE SKEPTICAL THEISM

Positive skeptical theism has an explanatory advantage over negative skeptical theism, in that instances of gratuitous suffering are accounted for by second-order considerations lacking in negative skeptical theism. The further benefits, in DePoe's estimation, include the avoidance of certain pitfalls associated with negative skeptical theism, such as moral paralysis and Divine Lies. He writes the following:

"Positive skeptical theism, however, can blunt the impact of seemingly gratuitous evils without immediately calling into doubt one’s knowledge about the purposes of God or our knowledge that is relevant to making moral judgments and responses. The existence of seemingly gratuitous evils will confirm the positive skeptical theist’s second-order purposes. Importantly, when it comes to making moral judgments and responding to apparent tragedy and injustice, the positive skeptical theist has good reason to believe that he should respond to these cases as we ordinarily believe we morally ought to (with actions of compassion, sympathy, and love), since this is one of the second-order purposes God has for creating a world with seemingly gratuitous evils. Rather than resulting in moral skepticism and paralysis, the positive skeptical theist is confirmed in his belief that the proper response to seemingly gratuitous evils is to act compassionately" [6].

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Footnotes:

[1] DePoe, John M. "On the Epistemological Framework for Skeptical Theism”

[2] Ibid.

[3] More exactly, DePoe writes, "It is important to keep in mind that the positive skeptical theist is not claiming to understand the first-order justification for any allegedly gratuitous evil. The positive skeptical theist must confess that there is no apparent reason or justification that he knows of that justifies any given horrendous evil. What the positive skeptical theist does purport to understand to some degree is a second-order justification for why God may create a world where there are seemingly gratuitous evils."

[4] Ibid.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Ibid.