An Argument for Truthmaker Theory

Roughly, truthmaker theory says this:

For any true proposition (or for any true atomic proposition), P, there is some fact in the world responsible for the truth P. That is, P is true because of some fact -- the truthmaker.

So a proposition like the earth orbits the sun is true because, in fact, the earth orbits the sun. And Jones is snub nosed is true because Jones actually has a snub nose. The earth orbiting the sun is the truthmaker for the first proposition and Jones's snub nose is the truth maker for the second. You'll never find a true proposition which lacks a truthmaker, according to truthmaker theory. Make sense? I think truthmaker theory is initially attractive. Most people, I imagine, think there are facts in the world that explain why true propositions are true (it isn't until people think more about truthmaker theory and discover some of the challenges to it that this initial appeal begins to wear off, if it does at all). Here's a neat little argument for truthmaker theory:

• You can assert the same thing using different terms. For example, the following claims are identical in content but differ with respect to terminology: (1) that young swan is flying vs that cygnet is flying; (2) Jones is a bachelor vs Jones is an unmarried male. On the other hand, some claims differ with respect to their content. They say different things about the world altogether. Call the first difference -- difference in terminology but sameness of content -- a terminological difference and the second difference -- a difference in description -- an ontological difference. This much seems right: there isn't a substantive difference between terminologically different claims but there is a substantive difference between ontologically different claims. What is the real difference? If truthmaker theory is true, there is a nice and easy answer. Terminologically different claims have the same truthmakers, while ontological different claims differ with respect to truthmakers. By citing differences (or lack of differences) in truthmakers, we can explain why there is a substantive difference between ontologically different claims and why there is not a substantive difference between terminologically different claims. It's all about differences in truthmakers. There you have it -- an explanatory argument for truthmaker theory [1].

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Footnotes:
[1] This argument is found in Koons and Pickavance, Metaphysics: The Fundamentals (2015).