Joyce Against Morality and Categorical Reasons

Richard Joyce has argued that morality is a fiction. That is, moral statements are always untrue. In specific, he targets categorical moral duties. A categorical duty is one that an agent is obligated to fulfill regardless of whether doing so promotes her interests, preferences or goals. Joyce thinks that if there are moral duties, they are categorical. His argument against categorical duties -- and, hence, against moral realism -- turns on the following premise: 

(1) if there are categorically applicable moral rules, then these supply categorical reasons for obedience. 

A categorical reason is a reason that does not appeal to any contingent facts about the agent (like her specific interests, goals, desires, etc.). However, Joyce thinks there aren't any categorical reasons. Reasons, he argues, are always relative to the interests and goals of the agent. The fact that a rain coat keeps a person dry is a reason for Sally to wear a rain coat given that she's interested in staying dry. So if a consideration doesn't concern the desires, preferences and goals of the agent, then it can't be a reason for her. So there are no categorical reasons. And if there are no categorical reasons, there are no categorical moral duties (and, hence, according to Joyce, morality is a fiction). 

In defense of (1), Joyce appeals to Mackie's platitude:

• Mackie's Platitdue (MP): it is necessary and a priori that, for any agent x, if x ought to ø, then x has a reason to ø. 

Shafer-Landau has argued, however, that Mackie's platitude is far from obvious. Platitudes, he thinks, are supposed to be obvious to those who grasp them (p. 110). But Mackie's platitude isn't like that. After all, we may wonder whether we have an obligation to, say, give away a lot of our wealth surplus to aid those living in poverty, even though doing so may frustrate our desires and goals. If Mackie's Platitude really was a platitude, it shouldn't be difficult to see that such questions are really confused. Since it is far from obvious that such questions are confused, MP is false (or at least, not a platitude).

Suppose, however, that some defense of (1) succeeds. What reason do we have for thinking there are no categorial reasons? Shafer-Landau summarizes Joyce's argument against categorial reasons as follows:

1. If there are categorical reasons, then, for any reasonable agent S, S might have reason to ø, but fail to be engaged by ø.
2. Reasons cannot fail in this way.
3. (Therefore) there are no categorical reasons. 

For a reason to "engage" an agent is for it to "motivate her, to spark an interest, to provide an affirmative answer to the question of the considerations importance" (p. 113). Shafer-Landau concedes premise 1 for the sake of argument, turning his criticism toward premise 2. According to him, Joyce's inclusion of premise 2 begs the question. Joyce assumes that reasons must be linked to things that could motivate the agent psychologically -- the usual motivational suspects include desires, preferences, goals and needs. But this entails that there are no categorical reasons, since categorical reasons, by definition, can sometimes fail to link to anything capable of motivating the agent. Hence, premise 2 assumes what needs to be argued for.