Filling Gaps with God: What's the Fallacy?
Sometimes there are "gaps" in our understanding. We hope to fill in those gaps by introducing new theories or by expanding upon well accepted theories. Not all "gap fillers" are equally good, however. And sometimes, when the filler is God, people protest that an illicit form of reasoning is happening: "God of the gaps" reasoning [1].
Take a closer look at this issue. When some phenomenon, E, is in need of explanation and no currently accepted explanations seem well suited for the job (yet, perhaps), we have an explanatory gap. For some such gaps, God is introduced as an explanatory option. Pretty quickly, however, someone objects that we're engaging in "God of the gaps" reasoning, a kind of fallacy. And the looming fallacy renders further evaluation unnecessary, it often seems. I've always struggled knowing what this fallacy amounts to. Here's one take.
"God of the gaps" reasoning might mean that we're introducing an explanation that is not well suited for the job. Theism isn't adequate for "gap filling." Perhaps it lacks explanatory power for E. Perhaps it is ad hoc. Perhaps it explains E well but struggles to conciliate other phenomena that need explaining. Perhaps it lacks simplicity. And so on. Understood this way, the idea is that theism is a poor explanation. But it's hard to see how any of this amounts to a fallacy. For starters, the theist may deny that theism fails in all these ways. Depending on the gap that needs filling, she may argue that theism is a good explanation. Some will disagree, of course. The disagreement should lead us into an evaluation of theism's explanatory virtues. And that is a legitimate way of advancing our understanding of the world. What's problematic about this? Where's the fallacy?
Any theory, in principle, could fail to be a good explanation. On the above interpretation of "God of the gaps," we could, in principle, have "Ether of the gaps," or, "space-time curvature of the gaps," or, "atoms of the gaps," or, "Darwinism of the gaps," and so on. Now, by and large the last few theories have succeeded as explanations. But that is a contingent fact about them. They didn't have to be good explanations (supposing the world had been different; or supposing our evidence had been different). Imagine they had failed as explanations. Would we really say that their introduction was an instance "___ of the gaps" reasoning? That would be odd. Suppose they had failed in previous contexts but were introduced to explain something new. Again, it's hard to see how this could amount to a fallacy. In general, there is nothing fallacious about exploring new or old theories for their explanatory usefulness––for gap filling. We do this all the time in science. What could make this fallacious in the case of God?
A dilemma emerges. If "God of the gaps" is just a way of saying that theism is a poor explanation, then "God of the gaps" does not identify a real fallacy or an inherently problematic way of approaching explanatory gaps. It boils down to saying, "that theory fails." If true, that sucks for theism, but it does not implicate theists in a fallacy (besides, for various phenomena, the theist will disagree that theism is a poor explanation). On the other hand, if "God of the gaps" is meant to identify a real fallacy, or an inherently problematic way of approaching explanatory gaps, it's not clear that many theists are engaged in it (though many are, I'm sure). How could introducing an explanatory competitor be fallacious? [2] Better to engage the theistic explanation, evaluate its explanatory goodness in the relevant context, and leave the illusive charge of fallaciousness aside, no?
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[1] The "God of the gaps" objection need not be understood as expressing a fallacy. However, it is often communicated in just that way. My aim here is to evaluate that take on it.
[2] If an explanation seems promising, we don't think that invoking it is an instance of "x of the gaps" reasoning; if it does not seem promising, we don't think invoking it is an instance of "x of the gaps" reasoning. We just say it's a bad explanation. So where is the fallacy?
[2] If an explanation seems promising, we don't think that invoking it is an instance of "x of the gaps" reasoning; if it does not seem promising, we don't think invoking it is an instance of "x of the gaps" reasoning. We just say it's a bad explanation. So where is the fallacy?
This dilemma doesn't work because the implication in each premise is false. I'll start with the first premise.
ReplyDelete"1.) If 'God of the gaps' is just a way of saying that theism is a poor explanation, then 'God of the gaps' does not identify a real fallacy or an inherently problematic way of approaching explanatory gaps."
Panaceas are considered poor explanations by their very nature. People who suggest that 'god of the gaps' arguments with this form are fallacious often seem to be leaning on this point. In example, "magic" as the explanation for anything is not very helpful. Panaceas come in degrees, as well. It is interesting to consider that invoking Ramuh the lightning god to explain electricity or lightning, Ifrit the fire god to explain burning/fire, and Shiva the ice god to explain burning/ice are all a little bit more informative than simply invoking magic as the explanation for a phenomenon. Tying this in with monotheism, monotheistic gods are omnipotent. Omnipotence here can be seen as an explanatory weakness, drawing us closer to panacea. In some perverse way, Ifrit may actually make a better explanatory gap-filler for fire than the God of the Bible! Maybe someone will be tempted to ask why we wouldn't want a panacea? At first blush, because explaining everything with precisely the same invocation, even if true, seems to explain absolutely nothing. "Why did the Earth form an atmosphere with so much oxygen?" "Well, of course because quantum mechanics demanded it, full stop." This isn't very informative, and I would charge someone with Quantum Mechanics of the gaps if it were used to explain away mysteries in this way.
So at least some forms of theism, of a particularly lazy variety, *are* inherently problematic.
On to the second premise of your dilemma.
"2.) On the other hand, if 'God of the gaps' is meant to identify a real fallacy, or an inherently problematic way of approaching explanatory gaps, it's not clear that the theist is engaged in it. How could introducing an explanatory competitor be fallacious?"
The following is a version of what I take people to thinking of as fallacious in ordinary 'god of the gaps' reasoning:
There is a gap in understanding of some aspect of the natural world.
Therefore, the cause must be non-natural or super-natural.
Is this not an "inherently problematic" way of approaching scientific discovery?
And I will offer a final version of the God of the Gaps argument that is inherently problematic:
X can possibly be explained by God.
Therefore, X is best explained by God.
I hope we all agree that's a fallacious inference. At the very least, to arrive at the conclusion, we need to find a way to narrow a list of plausible alternative explanations. But then we're no longer in the realm of "God of the Gaps" arguments. Then we're simply working with Inference to the Best Explanation. I suspect that this is why people are tempted to defend God of the Gaps reasoning, even when they are setting forward formally fallacious arguments. Really, from their perspective, they're performing an inference to the best explanation -- and they're puzzled as to why people are charging them with a fallacy. But maybe they have unstated premises, and so their interlocutors are just left with versions that formally match the aforementioned statements of we just went over. I think this is all too common, and probably why the term "God of the Gaps" wound up with the reputation it has today (according to wikipedia it did not start out with the same meaning).
Anyway your blog has been fun to read and think about. Thanks to Kyle Huitt for posting it on FB, where I saw it.
Chancecosm, thanks so much for your thoughts! That's very insightful. As I've discussed the matter with others, I've come across similar ways of framing the "god of the gaps" objection. I'm writing another post about it, but for now let me say this: I think you're right that there is something fallacious about the argument schemas you've give above. In so far as those schemas are the targets of "god of the gaps" objections, a real fallacy is being identified. What complicates matters, however, is that "god of the gaps" is often levied against theistic explanations that don't fit those schemas (anecdotal evidence: I run into this all the flippin time). This suggests that there are multiple different "god of the gaps" objections. Alternatively, maybe there is only one "real" objection and those who invoke it in the cases I have in mind are erring in their use of the concept. While that may be so, it makes analysis of the fallacy somewhat tricky. Take my post above as targetting either these potentially errant uses of "god of the gaps" or as targetting variation on "god of the gaps" that don't fit your schemas. And, of course, anyone is free to stipulate what they mean by "god of the gaps." Taking the above schemas as the relevant fallacy, "god of the gaps" seems to be identifying a real problem. Thanks for helping me see this. Also, Kyle Huitt is a swell dude. :)
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