Using Disparities to Make the Case for Reparations: What's the Problem?

Socio-economic disparities between African Americans and white Americans are often cited as evidence of the injury of historic racism. "How has historic racism injured African Americans?" one might ask. One answer points to disparities. Were it not for historic racism, the argument goes, African Americans would not have less than white Americans (on-balance). Reparationists are especially interested in this link because evidence of injury is a good place to start one's argument for the obligation to make repair. 

Stephen Winters has argued, however, that appealing to disparities to assess the injury of historic racism faces a problem. He writes: 

But it is not obvious that the benchmark provided by European-American ’power, wealth and privilege’ represents an appropriate measure [for the extent of the injury]. The reparations literature often presents European Americans as wrongful beneficiaries of racial inequality. If what European Americans possess is unjustly acquired, then it cannot function as a measure for assessing slavery’s injury. A person is not injured if she is denied that which it would be wrong for her to have.

The implication for the reparations debate is this: if what white Americans possess is unjustly acquired, it would be wrong for Black Americans to have it and, hence, Black-white disparities that constitute unjust enrichment cannot be the basis for a harm-based argument for reparation. 

Two responses are in order. First, I think this argument turns on an ambiguity regarding the use of "unjust enrichment." If "Sam is unjustly enriched" implies that it is morally wrong for Sam to be in possession of the relevant goods (call it "wrongful possession"), then Winters' argument has some plausibility. Suppose Jack robs a bank. However, because he is a racist (hating Bolivians), he excludes me from participating in the robbery. Were it not for his racism, I would share in his wealth. As a direct result of the robbery and my exclusion from it, there is now $100,000,000 difference between Sam and myself. Although this disparity is the result of a wrongdoing against me, I cannot cite it as grounds for repair. Part of the reason is that Sam is in wrongful possession of that wealth and, as Winters puts it, "A person is not injured if she is denied that which it would be wrong for her to have." So far, Winters' argument has the ring of plausibility. 

On the other hand, one might be unjustly enriched in a sense that doesn't imply that one is in wrongful possession of the relevant goods. Suppose Sam is enriched by unjust opportunity structures in society. The opportunity structures are unjust because they disadvantage people like Sal while advantaging people like Sam (and there is no difference between people like Sam and people like Sal that could justify this difference). Apart from skewing opportunity, these opportunity structures are otherwise just. If this is possible, Winters' argument sounds less plausible. By availing herself of these opportunity structures, Sam (but not Sal) is able to accumulate a good amount of wealth. Though an unjust situation, this hardly seems like a case where Sam is in wrongful possession of her level of wealth. Still, because of the skewed opportunity structures, there is a massive disparity in wealth between Sam and Sal. Intuitively, we can assess the extent of the harm against Sal by using Sam as a baseline. After all, were it not for the skewed opportunity structures in society, Sal would probably have similar levels of wealth (all else being equal). In such cases, Sal is not denied what it would be wrong for her to have (as in cases of wrongful possession). She is denied the opportunities that generally lead to wealth levels comparable to those of Sam.

The upshot: reparationists could make their argument by claiming that African Americans have been wronged through the inter-generational loss of opportunity structures which white Americans were privileged to have. There is a sense, then, in which they were denied the level of wealth enjoyed by white Americans. Hence, something like the median white wealth could be used as a baseline for assessing the extent of the injury of historic racism without triggering Winters' objection that, "A person is not injured if she is denied that which it would be wrong for her to have"––so long as the reparationist's argument is not that whites are in wrongful possession of these goods. 

Second, even if white Americans are unjustly enriched in the stronger sense according to which they are in wrongful possession of their wealth, Winters' argument might nevertheless fail. If you steal $100,000 from me and are thereby $100,000 richer, I can use your net wealth as a baseline for assessing the harm you've caused me. The fact that your level of well-offness constitutes wrongful possession does not imply that I do not have a claim to what you wrongfully possess. It's mine after all. This point might generalize to cases other than theft. Unjust benefits that are the direct consequence of my unjust suffering or exploited labor may very well be benefits that I have some claim to. Hence, Winters' assumption that if what white Americans possess is unjustly acquired, it would be wrong for Black Americans to have it, is mistaken––even on the stronger reading of "unjustly acquired."

Photo by Lucas van Oort on Unsplash